MONOKULTUR

Max Abrahms skriver i Newsweek at Musk blev hånet for at være forsigtig med sit Starlink, som han har foræret til Ukraine. Og så bemærker han at 

The longer the war goes on, the more the Biden administration and its NATO allies are throwing caution to the wind. Biden keeps consenting to supply weapons previously ruled out as excessively escalatory, from Patriot air defense systems to Abrams tanks to cluster munitions to F-16’s. The latest reversal is over the expected transfer of Army Tactical Missile Systems that can fly up to 190 miles, enabling Ukrainian forces to strike far beyond Russia’s defensive positions inside Crimea and deep into Russian sovereign territory.

National Security advisor Jake Sullivan used to rule out ATACMS “to ensure that we don’t get into a situation in which we are approaching the Third World War.” Even CNN, an enthusiastic advocate for greater American involvement in the war, has acknowledged the “fears about escalating the conflict.”

A couple months ago, Senator James Risch of Idaho told the Aspen Security Forum, “I’m tired of hearing about escalation. I want Putin to wake up in the morning worried about what he’s going to do that’s going to cause us to escalate.” Biden apparently now agrees.

The view now ruling the Democratic Party and the President is the same as the warmongers: It’s silly to worry as Musk does about turning the Ukraine war into something catastrophically worse. It’s un-American not to try to find Russia’s redline for starting World War III. It’s traitorous to believe—as the President himself did, just a few months ago—that we should be doing all we can to prevent escalation.

I samme Newsweek skriver Daniel L Davies om den ubegrundede jubeloptimisme den bebudede ‘Forårsoffensiv’

Despite great hopes for a rapid success, Ukraine’s months-in-the-making offensive has sputtered from the outset. That shouldn’t have surprised anyone in the White House. On April 5, two months before the start of the offensive, I wrote that “Zelensky’s troops—with little to no air power and a dearth in artillery ammunition—could suffer egregious casualties while gaining little.”

Five days later, The Washington Post revealed the contents of a leaked Top Secret U.S. intelligence assessment which likewise predicted the Ukrainian offensive would probably fall “well short” of expectations, and that “enduring Ukrainian deficiencies in training and munitions supplies probably will strain progress and exacerbate casualties during the offensive.” Total Ukrainian deaths in the war at that point were estimated to be as low as 17,500.

About a month before the start of the offensive, I again warned that the odds were stacked heavily against Kyiv. To succeed, I explained, Ukraine would “have to conduct the most difficult task in modern land warfare: a combined arms operation into the teeth of a dug-in enemy force that is prepared for an attack,” complicated by the shortage of artillery ammunition along with “limited airpower and minimal air defense.” Nevertheless, on the eve of battle, some Western analysts remained optimistic.

Once the offensive began on June 5, however, that optimism quickly evaporated. In the first two weeks of the fighting, Ukraine’s spearhead brigades suffered massive losses in armor and personnel while capturing virtually no territory. By the end of the third week, they had lost an estimated fifth of their strike force, requiring Ukraine to dramatically change tactics. Instead of leading with tanks and other armored vehicles (which were predictably getting chewed up in minefields and by Russian anti-tank missiles and artillery shells), Ukraine moved to an infantry-centric attack system.

Realisterne havde ret, skriver Lily Lynch i The New Statesman

Distant audiences, who always treated the war as a team sport, and Ukraine as an underdog defying the odds against a larger aggressor, are thinning out; surely many will soon turn their attention to the partisan conflict of the forthcoming US presidential election. Optimists say the change in the media’s tone is indicative of little more than the inevitable pendulum swings of war and that Ukraine may yet emerge victorious. But such a view elides a host of unavoidable realities.

At the centre of this cascade of disappointment lies Ukraine’s poor performance in the overhyped “spring counteroffensive”, which arrived several months late. Boosters in the press set expectations so high that Ukraine was practically set up for failure. “We’re about to see what a decentralised, horizontal, innovative high-tech force can do,” Jessica Berlin, a German and American political analyst, wrote in May. “Ukraine may be underfunded, undermanned and underequipped compared to Russia. But those tactical, adaptive Ukrainian strengths deliver what money can’t buy and training can’t teach. Get ready for some stunners.” In the Daily Telegraph, the soldier-turned-civilian-military-expert Hamish de Bretton-Gordon was effusive as recently as June: “As a former tank commander, I can say one thing for certain: Putin’s demoralised conscripts are utterly unprepared for the shock action now hitting their lines.”

(…) Early on, reporters framed the war as one of David vs Goliath, in which Ukrainian grandmothers downed Russian drones with jars of pickles. Ukraine’s astonishing performance in Kharkiv fuelled expectations. Early mythmaking has made recent disappointments all the more bitter. “There were wishful expectations that Russia would collapse, fold early on, especially after Ukraine heroically survived the first round, and people got carried away,” Patrick Porter, the realist scholar of international relations, said.

Men en udmattelseskrig mellem David og Goliath favoriserer Goliath. skriver videre

Most men eager to defend Ukraine joined the armed forces long ago, and many are now dead. The country now recruits among those effectively forced. Individually, stories about conscientious objectors, deserters, those hiding from conscription, and a war-weary public can appear anecdotal, but taken together, they begin to undermine one of the foundational tenets of the war: that Ukrainians want to fight, in the words of Joe Biden, the US president, “for as long as it takes”. And as expectations are dramatically scaled back, one cannot help but ask: for as long as it takes to do what?

As a more sober reality sets in, it’s worth asking why Western governments and the media were such effusive boosters of Ukraine’s war effort. The writer Richard Seymour has suggested that part of it was about identity formation, wherein Ukraine is emblematic of an “idealised Europe” or even democracy itself, while Russia represents Oriental despotism and authoritarianism. The war thus embodies the supposed civilisational struggle theorised by Samuel Huntington between democracies and autocracies, promoted by the Biden administration through initiatives such as its Summit for Democracy. That annual event aims to “renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad”, underlining the continuity between liberal opposition to the putative authoritarian affinities of Donald Trump and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

But beyond the merely symbolic there was a practical rationale for the kinds of coverage we saw in the war’s early months: the conflict in Ukraine has revived a waning Atlanticism – a long-sought aim of proponents of Nato enlargement. Just a few years ago Emmanuel Macron, the French president, declared Nato “braindead”; the war in Ukraine has brought it back to life.

Den tidligere våbeninspektør Scott Ritter skriver for det russiske propaganda organ Sputnik, at de ukrainske tab er voldsommere end det vi ellers får at vide.

Ukraine has dispatched the last of its strategic reserves, led by the elite 82nd Airlanding Brigade, into the battle for the Zaporozhye village of Rabotino. Here, in fields made fallow by conditions of war, Ukraine’s best fighting forces have been eviscerated by Russian defenders who have refused to yield. Based upon the experience of the lead elements of the 82nd Brigade, this fate awaits them as well.

It’s over!